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Constitutionalizing the Right of Workers to Organize, Bargain and Strike: The
Sight of One Shoulder Shrugging
Abstract: The Supreme Court of Canada may well conclude in Fraser that the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms confers upon agricultural workers the full panoply of bargaining rights
provided under contemporary Canadian collective bargaining legislation, from the right to be
represented exclusively by the bargaining agent chosen by the majority, to the right to engage
their employer in good faith negotiations, to the right to strike. If the Court does so, its
decision will be greeted with delight by progressive legal scholars, proponents of countervailing
power as a strategy of labour market regulation, and true believers in the potential of
constitutional and international rights discourse to transform political economy and social
relations. There will be congratulations all ‘round: to the skilled advocates who will have
achieved a famous victory against long odds; to the imaginative academics who will have
erected the conceptual scaffolding on which counsel’s arguments will have been
constructed; and not least, to the judges who will have finally liberated themselves from the
tyranny of precedent and sloughed off 200 years of curial antipathy to workers and their
interests.
Of course, not everyone will be delighted. Dour devotees of legal logic and historical accuracy
are likely to grimace or roll their eyes; neo‐liberals who favour unregulated labour markets and
managerial unilateralism will cry havoc; and sceptics who question the capacity of courts to
bring about deep and lasting change, and the wisdom of asking them to do so, will simply
shrug. I consider myself to be a progressive scholar who recalls the bygone era of collective
bargaining with great nostalgia; I admire skilled lawyers and free‐thinking judges and have built
the odd conceptual scaffold for both in my time; and I retain an atavistic attachment to logic
and historical accuracy. But because most of all I am a sceptic, I will shrug.
Of course, I will shrug with one shoulder only. Clearly, the Agricultural Employees Protection Act
was a cynical attempt to perpetuate the unjustified exclusion of workers on farms and in food
processing plants from the regime of collective bargaining. Clearly these workers should have
the same rights to organize, bargain and strike as workers in auto plants and banks—however
modest the value of those rights may turn out to be in practice. Consequently, if the Supreme
Court decides in their favour, one shoulder will remain firmly in place; but the other will shrug.
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Constitutionalizing the Right of Workers to Organize, Bargain and Strike: The
Sight of One Shoulder Shrugging
Harry Arthurs∗

I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court of Canada may well conclude in Fraser 1 that the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms 2 confers upon agricultural workers the full panoply of bargaining rights provided
under contemporary Canadian collective bargaining legislation, from the right to be
represented exclusively by the bargaining agent chosen by the majority, to the right to engage
their employer in good faith negotiations, to the right to strike. If the Court does so, its
decision will be greeted with delight by progressive legal scholars, proponents of countervailing
power as a strategy of labour market regulation, and true believers in the potential of
constitutional and international rights discourse to transform political economy and social
relations. There will be congratulations all ‘round: to the skilled advocates who will have
achieved a famous victory against long odds; to the imaginative academics who will have
erected the conceptual scaffolding on which counsel’s arguments will have been
constructed; and not least, to the judges who will have finally liberated themselves from the
tyranny of precedent and sloughed off 200 years of curial antipathy to workers and their
interests.
Of course, not everyone will be delighted. Dour devotees of legal logic and historical accuracy
are likely to grimace or roll their eyes;3 neo‐liberals who favour unregulated labour markets
and managerial unilateralism will cry havoc; and sceptics who question the capacity of courts
to bring about deep and lasting change, and the wisdom of asking them to do so, will simply
shrug. I consider myself to be a progressive scholar who recalls the bygone era of collective
bargaining with great nostalgia; I admire skilled lawyers and free‐thinking judges and have built
∗

University Professor Emeritus and President Emeritus, York University. I am grateful for the research assistance
of Danielle Bisnar, and for the helpful comments of participants at the symposium on the Constitutionalization of
the Right to Strike, University of Toronto, December 5, 2009.
1

Fraser v. Ontario (Attorney General) (2008) 301 D.L.R. (4th) 335; leave to appeal granted by the Supreme Court of
Canada in Ontario (Attorney General) v. Fraser [2009] S.C.C.A. No. 9
2

The Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Sch. B to the Canada Act 1982
((U.K.), c. 11 (“the Charter”).
3

See e.g. E. Tucker, “The Constitutional Right to Bargain Collectively: The Ironies of Labour History in the Supreme
Court of Canada" (2008) 61 Labour/Le Travail 151; B Langille, “The Freedom of Association Mess: How We Got
into It and How We Can Get Out of It” (2009) 54 McGill L.J. 177.

2010]

CONSTITUTIONALIZING THE RIGHT OF WORKERS

5

the odd conceptual scaffold for both in my time; and I retain an atavistic attachment to logic
and historical accuracy. But because most of all I am a sceptic, I will shrug.
Of course, I will shrug with one shoulder only. Clearly, the Agricultural Employees Protection Act
was a cynical attempt to perpetuate the unjustified exclusion of workers on farms and in food
processing plants from the regime of collective bargaining. Clearly these workers should have
the same rights to organize, bargain and strike as workers in auto plants and banks—however
modest the value of those rights may turn out to be in practice. Consequently, if the Supreme
Court decides in their favour, one shoulder will remain firmly in place; but the other will shrug.
4

Let me explain why.

II. THE INEFFICACY OF CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION
In a recent co‐authored article, “Does the Charter Matter?”,5 attempted to gather all available
social and economic data that might help to determine whether since 1982 Canada had
changed in the direction the Charter sought to promote. Our methodology was far from
perfect; but as no one has so far challenged it or proposed a better one, I stand by our
conclusions: despite the profound changes it has brought about in legal theory, doctrine,
practice and institutions, the Charter has made little actual difference in our social, economic
and political life. Some things have got better; some have got worse; but mostly, they have
remained about the same. Moreover, when they have got better — for gays and lesbians for
example — it is an open question whether the Charter is the cause or whether judicial rulings
in these cases are a consequence of widespread changes in social attitudes that produced
equally positive outcomes in countries with no Charter equivalent. And where things have got
worse—as in the criminal justice system—one must similarly ask about cause and effect. Has
the Charter made things worse, by stirring up police militancy and populist outrage, much as
the school desegregation decisions did in the United States? Or would the trend towards
strong‐arm policing and punitive sentencing have been even worse absent the Charter?
The tentative conclusion of our article — that the Charter does not matter very much —
represents a hypothesis that can be tested in the following thought experiment. Imagine that
ten or twenty years have elapsed since Pepsi‐Cola6 and Dunmore7 and BC Health Services8 and
Fraser:9 Will we likely find a higher proportion of union members in the workforce? Greater
4
5

S.O. 2002 c. 16.
H. Arthurs & B. Arnold, “Does the CharterCharter Matter?” (2005) 11 Rev of Constitutional Studies 37.

6

R.W.D.S.U., Local 558 v Pepsi‐Cola Canada Beverages (West) Ltd. [2002] 1 S.C.R. 156 (“Pepsi‐Cola”)

7

Dunmore v Ontario (AG) [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016.

8

Health Services and Support ‐ Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v British Columbia [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391 (“B.C.
Health”)
9

Supra note 1.
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union militancy and greater public support for collective bargaining? Improved wages and
working conditions? Enhanced job security and a more effective voice for workers in corporate
governance? Easier access to labour markets for those who have been excluded from work, and
more generous provision for those who confront redundancy or retirement?
The answer to all of these questions, I predict, is likely to be no. Moreover, to the extent that
the answer is yes, improvements in the situation of workers are likely to be attributable not to
Charter decisions but to other causes, such as a reaction to growing income inequality and
recurring and deepening economic crises. Indeed, it is very pertinent — or perhaps impertinent
— to note that the improvements in labour’s legal fortunes under the Charter over the past
decade have coincided with a steep decline in union membership and bargaining power, in
workers’ job security and real incomes, in the effectiveness of systems of labour market
regulation and social protection, and in labour’s political influence and cultural salience.
Why is labour’s lot unlikely to improve regardless of what the Supreme Court has to say about
workers’ Charter rights? Here, in abbreviated form, are some possible answers: neo‐liberalism;
globalization and a new international division of labour; Canada’s integration into a US‐
dominated economic space; changes in technology; changes in human resource management
strategies; outsourcing and off shoring; demographic change and enhanced diversity in the
workforce; the end of internal labour markets; the rise of non‐standard and precarious
employment; the business community’s insurgency against market regulation and the taxpayer
revolt against the welfare state. All of these have contributed to the erosion of labour’s identity
and solidarity, to the unravelling of labour’s postwar industrial and political strategies, and to
the diminished coverage and efficacy of our collective bargaining system and social legislation.
If, as I will next argue, “labour’s” collective identity and solidarity are indeed dissolving; if
“labour” as a class or workplace collectivity is no longer capable of effective concerted action;
if many prospective targets of such action are no longer within reach of Canadian law; if
traditional labour objectives like job security and pensions can no longer be achieved by
winning concessions from individual employers, the Supreme Court’s recent guarantees of
labour’s right to organize, bargain, picket and (perhaps) strike will have arrived too late to
make much of a difference.
But then, as our study suggests, the difference made by Supreme Court decisions — and by the
Charter itself — may always have been over‐estimated. Social and economic relations —
including employment relations — are largely determined not by the formal, juridical
constitution but by what I have called the “real constitution”10 — the steep gradient of wealth
and power that determines so much in our society. People who have more wealth and power
are likely to enjoy better health, housing, education and careers than those who have less. They
10

H. Arthurs, “Labour and the ‘Real’ Constitution” (2007) 48 Cahiers du droit 43.
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are also more likely to participate in politics and civic life, and to receive respectful treatment
from public officials and the police. And finally, they are more likely to know their rights and to
possess the psychic and financial resources needed to vindicate them.11Nonetheless, the Court
has so far declined to recognize poor people or workers as “analogous groups” whose members
are entitled to economic equality with their more affluent fellow citizens under section 15.12
Nor, if the Court sought to expand the reach of section 15 in this way, is it possible to imagine
how it could achieve its goals without engaging in a far‐reaching redistribution of wealth for
which it lacks both a mandate and institutional competence.

III. THE ROLE OF CONSTITUTIONALIZATION IN REDUCING THE AUTONOMY AND
EFFECTIVENESS OF LABOUR LAW
The historic tendency of labour law had, until lately, been toward autonomy and away from
alignment with the “regular” legal system.13 This tendency represented not just a reaction to
the observable fact that many individual judges were hostile to the interests of workers.
Rather, it was driven by two evidence‐based concerns: that the values and doctrines of the
regular legal system assumed and reinforced a paradigm of social relations in which workers
occupied a subordinate rank; and that “ordinary” legal processes and institutions were
incapable of comprehending the meaning or of responding to the dynamic of labour relations.
Labour law’s historic autonomy project was in many ways successful. The substantive law of
employment relations was increasingly codified on the basis of a new and different paradigm of
workers as “citizens at work” (not new enough or different enough, some would argue). And
this new and distinctive labour law was increasingly administered by specialized labour
tribunals, with some degree of expertise in industrial relations, and with procedures and
powers that permitted timely and efficacious responses to the power‐sensitive and fast‐moving
world of industrial relations. But the courts have always resisted labour law’s autonomy
11

I have developed these ideas in several articles: “Does the Charter Matter?” supra note 4 ; “Labour and the Real
Constitution” supra note 9; and “Constitutionalism ‐ An Idea Whose Time Has Come … and Gone?” (2008) 75:3
Amicus Curiae 3.
12

Section 15(1): “Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and
equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or
ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.” The Supreme Court’s unwillingness to
consider workers or poor people as an “analogous” group worthy of Charter protection confirms (as does
everyday observation) that the real constitution trumps the Charter.See e.g. B.C. Health supra note 7 at para. 166;
Dunmore supra note 6; Gosselin v Quebec (Attorney General) [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429; Boulter v Nova Scotia Power
[2009] NSCA 17 (leave to appeal denied, at http://scc.lexum.umontreal. ca/en/ news_release/2009/09‐09‐
10.3a/09‐09‐10.3a.html (last visited September 23, 2009) and more generally S. Boyd, G. Brodsky and S. Day (eds),
Poverty: Rights, Citizenship, Legal Activism (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007).
13

I have traced this tendency in H. Arthurs, “Developing Industrial Citizenship: A Challenge for Canada's Second
Century” (1967) 45 Can. Bar R. 786; “Understanding Labour Law: The Debate Over “Industrial Pluralism” (1985) 38
Curr. Leg. Prob. 83; and “Without the Law”: Administrative Justice and Legal Pluralism in Nineteenth Century
England (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press 1985).
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projectand, to some extent, legislatures have as well. A partial list of examples includes: the
insistence that cross‐examination be permitted in certification proceedings as in adversary‐
style criminal and civil trials;14 the refusal to acknowledge that arbitrators possess inherent
procedural15 or remedial16 powers; the resistance to replacing the common law industrial
torts with statutory rules for waging conflict;17 the grudging curial deference accorded to
interpretations of labour or general law by labour boards and arbitrators;18 the entrenchment
of non‐constitutional judicial review;19 and of course the Charter’s suffocating embrace of
labour tribunals.20
However, despite these — and other — object lessons in the dangers of entanglement in the
general law, some former supporters and beneficiaries of labour law’s autonomy project have
been tempted by the current run of pro‐worker Charter decisions to abandon it . I can
understand the temptation: labour statutes, tribunals and ministries are not what they used to
be. In some cases, they have been actively mobilized to advance the cause of neo‐liberalism; in
others they have been allowed to slide into obsolescence for want of legislative or
administrative modernization; in still others they have been incapacitated by being denied an
adequate cadre of committed and knowledgeable personnel. Nonetheless, the present
shortcomings of the labour law system will not be remedied by its reincorporation into the
general legal system, especially if this is to be accomplished by judges responding ad hoc, and
on the basis of broad principles, to the specific conflicts they are asked to adjudicate.
Courts, I would argue, are less well situated than industrial relations experts to design collective
bargaining systems. At the very least, the two groups operate on very different assumptions.
Courts believe in the power of normativity to transform reality; industrial relations experts
believe that economic and social power in reality shapes legal norms. Courts believe in the
14

In re Ontario Labour Relations Board, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 18.

15

Union Carbide Canada Ltd. v. Weiler et al., [1968] S.C.R. 966.

16

Port Arthur Shipbuilding Co. v. Arthurs et al., [1969] S.C.R. 85.

17

For an early and persuasive statement of the case for displacing common law doctrine and remedies relating to
industrial conflict with statutory norms and remedies, see Report of the Task Force on Labour Relations (H.D.
Woods, Chair) (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 1968) at 177‐187.For an account of a youth misspent in a vain attempt to
promote this idea see H. Arthurs ““Woe unto You, Judges: or How Reading Frankfurter and Greene ‘The Labor
Injunction’ Ruined Me as a Labour Lawyer and Made Me as an Academic” (2002) 29 Journal of Law and Society
657.

18

For the most recent iteration of this debate see New Brunswick (Board of Management) v. Dunsmuir 2008 SCC

9.
19

Crevier v Québec (Attorney General) [1981] 2 S.C.R. 220.

20

Weber v Ontario Hydro, [1995] 2 SCR 929.
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permanence and solidity of law; experts are all too aware of its transience and fragility. Courts
believe in the generality of law: everyone is bound by the constitution; everyone should enjoy
the protections of the Charter.
Experts tend to believe in law’s specificity: different
circumstances and situations call for different treatment; if statutes cannot be drafted ab initio
to ensure difference, difference can and should be accommodated by delegating regulation‐
making powers or adjudicative discretion to an expert administrative body.21
Nonetheless, a court‐managed exercise in the design of an industrial relations regime for
agricultural workers will likely be launched by the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in
Fraser, the Supreme Court’s response to that decision, and the ensuing “dialogue” (if any)22
between that Court and the Ontario legislature.. By extension, the design ultimately deemed
by the Court to pass constitutional muster will almost certainly determine the options available
to other groups disfavoured by current arrangements. And ultimately, the tail will wag the dog:
Charter constraints adopted to protect marginalized groups of workers will determine the range
of options available for the future overall redesign of the industrial relations system.
Consider, therefore, the range of legislative responses that the Supreme Court might accept as
meeting the “freedom of association” test laid down in BC Health and (one anticipates)
reaffirmed in Fraser.
• The Court might require that the legislature treat agricultural workers in precisely the same
way as all other “employees”?23It might therefore decide that they have the same right as other
workers to strike after selecting a bargaining agent, securing certification, engaging in good
faith negotiations, and exhausting the conciliation procedures laid down in the Labour Relations
Act24. But what if such rights avail them naught? What if those procedures are so attenuated
that seasonal workers are unable to exercise them? Or if unskilled agricultural workers are so
easy to replace that they cannot mount an effective strike? Or if produce can easily be
imported to replace crops grown locally by striking workers? Could a sympathetic legislature
decide, for example, to replace the right to strike with compulsory arbitration? Or to substitute
legislated labour standards for negotiated terms and conditions of employment?
• Or the Court might allow the legislature to create a separate but equal collective bargaining
regime for agricultural workers, as it has for civil servants25 and teachers,26 and for public
21

For the fullest adumbration of this idea in the Canadian context, see P. Weiler, Reconcilable Differences: New
Directions in Canadian Labour Law (Carswell, Toronto, 1980).

22

P. Hogg & A.Bushell, “The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures” (1997) 35 OHLJ 75 and P. Hogg, A.
Bushell Thornton & W. Wright, “Charter Dialogue Revisited” (2007) 45 OHLJ 1; but see contra G. Huscroft,
“Constitutionalism from the Top Down” (2007) 45 OHLJ 91 and A. Petter “Taking Dialogue Much Too Seriously”
(2007) 45 OHLJ 147.
23
24
25

This is the strong implication of Chief Justice Winkler’s judgment.
Ontario Labour Relations Act, 1995, S.O. Chapter 1, Schedule A
Crown Employees Collective Bargaining Act, S.O. 1993 c 38 as amended.
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safety, 27 college,28 construction29 and hospital workers?30 However, no one can predict what
degree of deference the Court will accord to a legislative determination about what is “equal”
and what needs to be “separate”. What one can predict is that with the best of intentions,
the Supreme Court is unlikely to appreciate the subtleties of labour‐management relations in
agriculture, and the rules, processes and institutions appropriate to regulate them.I offer as
Exhibit A the Court’s attempt in Weber to protect and expand the jurisdiction of labour
arbitration boards, thereby rendering them virtually incapable of performing their core
functions. 31 Exhibits B to Z are available on request.
• Or the Court might be minimally prescriptive. It might simply say, as it did in Pepsi‐Cola
with regard to picketing,32 that agricultural workers are free to strike at any time ‐‐ so long as
they do not commit a crime or tort (or, for that matter, breach a statute or a contract). Anyone
familiar with the common law or criminal law of picketing (other than judges of the Supreme
Court) would recognize how drastic a restriction lies concealed within this apparently modest
caveat.33Postmodernism has been described as “private jokes in public places”. The same is
likely to be said of Pepsi‐Cola, and perhaps of B.C. Health and Fraser once their post‐history
unfolds.
Each of these three possible scenarios for post‐Fraser legislation suggests that court‐mandated,
Charter‐driven solutions to the plight of agricultural workers may well achieve too much or too
little. This is not to assert that statutory schemes designed by experts and enacted by
legislators — also known as politicians —inevitably respect the norms of sound industrial
relations. The statutes impugned in BC Health, Dunmore and Fraser are evidence to the
26

See Police Services Act, S.O. Part VIII; Fire Protection and Prevention Act, S.O. 1997 c. 4. Part IX.

27

Education Act R.S.O. c. E‐2 part X.1.

28

Colleges Collective Bargaining Act 2008 S.O. c. 15.

29

Labour Relations Act, supra note 24, ss. 126 – 168 as amended.

30

Hospital Labour Disputes Arbitration Act, R.S.O. 1990 c. H.14.

31

Supra note 20. See e.g. M. Picher, “Defining the Scope of Arbitration: The Impact of Weber – An Arbitrator’s
Perspective” (1999‐2000) Lab. Arb. Y. B. 99; H. Arthurs, “The New Economy and the New Legality: Industrial
Citizenship and the Future of Labour Arbitration,” (2000) 7 CLELJ 45; C. Mummé, “Labour Arbitration as
Translation: The Transformation of Canadian Labour Arbitration in the Twentieth Century from a Semi‐
Autonomous Institution of the Shop to an Institution of the State” (January 1, 2008). Available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/ abstract=1485682
32
33

Supra note 6 at para. 68.

See e.g. H. Arthurs, “Tort Liability for Strikes in Canada: Some Problems of Judicial Workmanship” (1960) 38 Can.
Bar R. 346; I. Christie, The Liability of Strikers in the Law of Tort (Kingston: Industrial Relations Centre, 1967); S.
Tacon, Tort Liability in a Collective Bargaining Regime (Toronto: Butterworths, 1980).
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contrary.I do argue, however, that to use the Charter as a template for the design of industrial
relations systems is to increase the risk that in the long term, the approach of courts will
prevail over that of experts. This in turn enhances the likelihood that legislatures will arrive at
dysfunctional or at least sub‐optimal solutions.
Worse yet: even if Charter‐driven solutions work well at the time they are adopted, their
constitutional character virtually ensures that we will have to live with them long after they
have ceased to work well. Will we, for example, always accept that a conflict‐based system
which entrenches the right to strike is intrinsically fairer for workers than a principles‐based
system in which wages and working conditions are adjudicated? Or that a system in which
important benefits are delivered to workers through collective bargaining is necessarily more
efficient than one in which such benefits are delivered by the state? Or that a system which
keeps workers and employers at arm’s length is preferable to one where workers share
ownership and control of the enterprise? Or that a system which awards majority unions
exclusive bargaining rights is more likely to promote union membership and strength than one
where minority unionism is permitted?34 I am not advocating that we abandon our present
system in favour of any of these alternatives; but I am arguing that we ought to be as wary of
constitutionalizing the modalities of our present system of collective bargaining as (in
hindsight) we should have been in constitutionalizing denominational schools in Newfoundland
or the ferry to Prince Edward Island.

IV. WHAT DOES CONSTITUTIONALIZATION SIGNIFY?
What remains, of course, is to clarify what we mean by “constitutionalization”.35
Much of my analysis has proceeded on the basis that constitutionalization involves embedding
in our basic law a legally enforceable right from which no legislature or court can derogate.Used
in this sense, constitutionalization requires that we determine whether an activity, such as a
strike, is protected or guaranteed by specific constitutional language.Thus, the Court of
Appeal in Fraser held that the right to bargain collectively, as understood in our present
system, is guaranteed by section 2(d) of the Charter as the exercise of “freedom of
association.”36 Brian Langille has argued to the contrary, that the right of agricultural workers to
be treated like other workers should be guaranteed under section 15 of the Charter as an
equality right.37And conceivably — nothing is inconceivable after Chaoulli38 — since collective
34

On this point see R. Adams, Industrial Relations under Liberal Democracy: North America in Comparative
Perspective (USC Press 1995); and R. Adams, Labour Left Out: Canada’s Failure to Protect and Promote Collective
Bargaining as a Human Right (Ottawa: Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2006).However Adams’ argument against
majoritarian unionism was specifically rejected by Chief Justice Winkler in Fraser, supra note ?? at paras. 86‐93 .

35

For a taxonomy see H. Arthurs, “The Constitutionalization of Employment Relations: Pernicious Problems,
Multiple Models” (2010) [forthcoming].
36

Supra note 1 at para. 101.

37

Supra note 2.
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bargaining, and ultimately strikes, may in given circumstances be the only means by
whichagricultural workers can defend their “liberty” or the “security of [their] person”, their
right to strike should be guaranteed under section 7 of the Charter.39
I will leave that debate to others. Instead I want to note that an older and different meaning of
“constitution” is rooted in British public law and therefore, because of its “constitution similar
in principle” preamble, in our Constitution Act 1867 as well.
In this usage, the word
“constitution” is less prescriptive than descriptive: it identifies, explains and gives legitimacy to
the way in which things are presently constituted, without necessarily creating enforceable
rights. This may explain Chief Justice Winkler’s reasoning in Fraser to the effect that since
“labour relations policy in Canada has long recognized” the desirability of our present collective
bargaining system, the main features of that system are entitled to “constitutional”
protection.40A similar usage of “constitution” has a very long history in industrial relations
discourse.41It survives down to the present in union claims that “custom” or “past practice”
may require that employers respect certain workplace norms even though they are not based
on the specific terms of a collective agreement, and in the assertion by employers of their
“inherent management right” to retain unilateral control of all aspects of decision‐making in
the enterprise other than those explicitly agreed to be taken jointly with the union.
However, such arguments are not without their difficulties. For example, if the longevity of a
system automatically entitles it to constitutional protection, how will old systems ever be
superseded by new ones? Nonetheless, the description of a privileged and presumptively
entrenched status quo as “constitutional” does serve one useful purpose. It forces us to look
carefully at “how things are constituted”, and to scrutinize proposed changes with equal care.
Thus the real importance of attributing constitutional significance to workers’ rights is not that
they thereby become enforceable or, as I earlier suggested, that if they are enforced in
individual cases, significant and positive social and economic changes necessarily ensue in the
industrial relations system. Rather, the claim that certain rights enjoy constitutional status
forces us to confront the conflicts inherent in our political economy and social order, in the

38

Chaoulli v Québec (Attorney General) [2005] SCR 791.

39

Section 7 reads as follows: “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to
be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.”

40
41

Fraser supra note 1 at para. 87– 88.

A very early example of a so‐called “ancient constitution” governing employment relations involved the
Crowley Iron Works, an 18th century proto‐capitalist enterprise: see A. Harding, A Social History of English Law
(Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1966) at 327 A partial text of the Crowley “constitution” is found in M.W. Flinn
(ed), The Law Book of the Crowley Ironworks (Durham: Surtees Society, 1952).

2010]

CONSTITUTIONALIZING THE RIGHT OF WORKERS

13

conventions of employment relations, and in the interpretation of our basic law by our highest
Court.
The characterization of “labour” in Canadian constitutional law is a case in point. Legislative
authority over labour issues was originally assigned to the provinces precisely because such
issues were perceived to be matters of “civil [i.e. contractual] rights”, and of a “merely local and
private nature”42 under s. 92 of the Constitution Act. By contrast, in contemporary judicial
rhetoric, labour legislation, common law doctrines bearing on workers’ rights, and the actions
of public employers are subject to Charter standards precisely because they implicate issues
of self‐fulfillment, personal identity and dignity, the well‐being of individuals and families,
freedom, justice and power.43 These characterizations are fundamentally at odds with each
other. The former assigns the employment relation to the domain of private ordering and
regulation (if any) on a local level; the latter contemplates, even invites, active state
intervention with a view to ensuring decent working conditions and equal employment rights
for all Canadians.
A similar shift in the characterization of workers’ rights and interests is also manifest in the
Supreme Court’s changing attitude to international labour standards. Such standards were
once adjudged so remote from “local” wage bargains made “in the province” and under its
legislative authority that even ratification of those standards by the federal government gave
them no legal effect.44 Now, it appears, they are so fundamental to our jurisprudence that
even without a province’s accession or enactment they can pour new meaning into the Charter,
de‐legitimate its legislation and rewrite its common law.45Of course this new (and possibly
exaggerated) deference to international norms may be a mere rhetorical device used by judges
to reinforce their preferred outcome in a particular case. On the other hand, it may constitute
belated acknowledgement by courts of what the rest of us have known for some time: that
employment relationships are now constituted by global and national labour markets; that a
decent system of industrial relations is a prerequisite for Canada’s civil peace, social justice and
economic development; and that the time has come to characterize labour issues as public and
national or global, not contractual, private and local.
Such a reconceptualization of “labour” might have far‐reaching consequences. It might permit
the regulation of industrial relations across Canada’s nationwide labour market,46
42

Toronto Electric Commissioners v Snider [1925] A.C. 394.
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A stirring early example was the dissenting judgment of Dickson CJC and Wilson J in Reference re Public Service
Employees Relations Act (Alberta) [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313.
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Reference re: Weekly Rest in Industrial Undertakings Act (Can.) [1937] A.C. 326 (Labour Conventions case).
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Dunmore supra note 6 ; B.C. Health supra note 7;Pepsi Cola supra note 5; and see G. England, "The Impact of
the Charter on Individual Employment Law in Canada: Rewriting an Old Story" (2006) 13 CLELJ 1.
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The existence of a nationwide labour market is guaranteed under the Charter by the mobility rights provision
(section 6(2)) and underpinned by the commitment in principle to equalization of provincial revenues and the
elimination of regional disparities of access to public goods (section 36).
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unconstrained by jurisdictional boundaries, and might facilitate linkages between labour
market issues and other policy domains It might force us to acknowledge, for example, that
minimum wage statutes do not merely set out the non‐derogable terms of the employment
bargain; they help to reduce the incidence and eliminate the effects of poverty.‐ It might
lead us to accept that pension laws do not merely regulate arrangements under which wages
can be deferred and tax‐sheltered until retirement; they define the future life prospects of a
rapidly increasing segment of Canada’s population. And it might prompt us to recollect that
collective bargaining legislation does not merely establish countervailing economic power in
individual workplaces; it enables the formation of a worker‐based political movement with the
capacity to influence debates on public policies ranging from health care to immigration, from
free trade to taxation. In short, reconceptualization of labour’s constitutional significance
might open our eyes to new policy approaches, engage new actors, remind us of normative
regimes whose influence we have not previously suspected, and make evident new
connections among ideas and events, interests and institutions.
Reconceptualization “might” do all of these things, but so far it has done none of them. The
reason is that Charter litigation is self‐regarding; it focuses on changes read into the formal,
juridical constitution by judges rather than changes in the “real” constitution wrought by the
contending forces of political economy; and it assumes but fails to explore — let alone
empirically demonstrate — any connection between these two constitutions. My one‐
shouldered shrug, then, is meant to provoke those concerned about labour’s plight to
acknowledge more explicitly the primacy of social and political over legal mobilization, and to
engage more extensively in scholarship that takes them beyond the boundaries of rights
discourse.

